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Comrades Editorial · 13 Oct 2026 (PDF)

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In this edition

  1. WHO Pandemic Treaty and India’s Stakes International Relations

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International Relations

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WHO Pandemic Treaty and India’s Stakes

Source This editorial is based on “India’s stakes in the Global Pandemic Agreement” published in the Hindu on 08/10/2026. The article highlights that India must bridge North-South health divides by protecting national sovereignty while advancing equitable vaccine access. Leveraging its pharmaceutical prowess, digital health infrastructure, and PABS negotiations, India can champion sustainable pandemic preparedness for the Global South. At the UN High-Level Meeting (UN HLM) in September 2026, India made official remarks on the Political Declaration on Pandemic Prevention, Preparedness, and Response (PPPR), positioning itself as a key actor in shaping the emerging global legal regime led by the WHO Pandemic Agreement (PA). The emerging WHO Pandemic Agreement represents a landmark initiative to reform global health security following Covid-19 as it establishes a legally binding framework focused on equity and preparedness. India plays a critical role in balancing Global South interests with national sovereignty while securing access to life-saving countermeasures. However, resolving negotiations over pathogen benefit-sharing remains vital to operationalizing this global health architecture. What is the WHO Pandemic Agreement?
  • About
    • The WHO Pandemic Agreement (often referred to as the Pandemic Treaty) is a landmark, legally binding international treaty adopted by consensus at the 78th World Health Assembly (Resolution WHA78.1) under Article 19 of the WHO Constitution.
      • It represents only the 2nd legally binding health convention established in WHO history, following the 2003 Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) (ratified by India in 2004).
    • To reform international health security, member states pursued two parallel legal and political instruments, i.e., the legally binding WHO Pandemic Agreement and high-level Political Declarations on Pandemic Prevention, Preparedness, and Response (PPPR) spearheaded by the United Nations General Assembly.
    • Negotiated over three years via the Intergovernmental Negotiating Body (INB), the Agreement establishes a systemic, equity-driven architecture designed to prevent, prepare for, and respond to future global health emergencies.
    • Its text has been adopted, but the Agreement has not yet entered into force because its Pathogen Access and Benefit-Sharing (PABS) annex remains under negotiation.
      • Finalisation of the PABS annex will enable signature and consideration of ratification. Under Article 33, entry into force occurs 30 days after the deposit of the 60th instrument of ratification or equivalent acceptance.
  • Key Provisions
    • Pathogen Sharing Linked to Equitable Access to Products:
      • It envisages rapid sharing of pathogen materials and genetic sequence information, alongside equitable sharing of resulting vaccines, therapeutics and diagnostics. This addresses the concern that countries providing pathogen samples may subsequently struggle to obtain the products developed using them.
      • During a pandemic emergency, participating manufacturers would provide WHO with access, targeting 20% of their real-time production, a minimum of 10% as donations, with the remaining percentage reserved at affordable prices, allowing flexibility according to manufacturer capacity.
    • One Health Prevention and Coordinated Disease Surveillance:
      • Recognizing that over 60% of emerging infectious diseases originate in animals (e.g., Avian Influenza H5N1, Ebola, Nipah), the treaty integrates a One Health framework connecting human, animal, and environmental health surveillance ecosystems.
      • It mandates continuous, real-time bio-surveillance at high-risk interfaces (such as wet markets, intensive livestock operations, and deforestation frontiers) to intercept potential outbreaks before human-to-human transmission escalates.
    • Resilient Health Systems and Protected Emergency Workforce:
      • The Agreement supports stronger health systems, trained multidisciplinary personnel and emergency-response capabilities.
      • Article 7 of the Agreement specifically addresses workers’ safety, mental health, discrimination, harassment and emergency-related injury or death. It also supports emergency teams and international deployment at countries’ request, recognising that equipment alone cannot deliver an effective response.
    • Technology Transfer & Regionalized Manufacturing Ecosystems:
      • To prevent reliance on centralized Western and East Asian manufacturing hubs, the Agreement promotes voluntary licensing, know-how transfer, and patent pooling.
      • Supports initiatives such as the mRNA Technology Transfer Programme (headquartered in South Africa) and regional vaccine facilities across Latin America, Asia, and Africa, ensuring localized industrial self-reliance during crises.
      • Requires member states to harmonize national regulatory authorities (e.g., fast-tracked emergency use authorizations) to accelerate the deployment of safe medical countermeasures.
    • Collaborative Research and Stronger Product-Regulation Systems:
      • The Agreement supports geographically diverse research capacities, international collaboration and sharing of research information, particularly to strengthen developing-country participation in the innovation process.
      • Article 8 covers expedited regulatory review, emergency authorisation and continued monitoring of safety and effectiveness. The aim is to shorten avoidable approval delays while retaining oversight of pandemic-related products.
    • Coordinated Supply Chains and Need-Based Product Distribution:
      • A WHO-coordinated Global Supply Chain and Logistics Network (GSCL) is envisaged to facilitate rapid and equitable access to pandemic-related products. It addresses the practical gap between producing medical supplies and delivering them to countries facing shortages.
      • Products supplied through PABS would be allocated according to public-health risk and need, with particular attention to developing countries.
    • Sustainable Financing and Support for Preparedness Capacity: The Coordinating Financial Mechanism, already established under the International Health Regulations (IHR) framework, will also support implementation of the Pandemic Agreement. Its functions include strengthening preparedness capacities and facilitating surge financing, especially for developing countries.
    • National Sovereignty, and Complementary Legal Frameworks:
      • The Agreement does not authorise WHO to impose lockdowns, vaccination mandates or national laws. A Conference of the Parties (COP) will oversee implementation, supported by reporting and a cooperative, non-punitive implementation mechanism.
      • It complements the IHR, which provide the existing framework for international health-emergency detection, notification and coordination. The Agreement adds cooperation on preparedness, production, equitable access and related capacities.
  • Political Declaration On Pandemic Prevention, Preparedness And Response (PPPR)
    • Nature and Adoption:
      • The UN Political Declaration is a non-binding political commitment, distinct from the WHO treaty framework.
      • The UN General Assembly adopted the PPPR Political Declaration on 12th October 2026, with 153 votes in favour, 3 against and 2 abstentions.
    • Main Priorities and Rationale: It mobilises political support for stronger health systems, equitable access to medical products, international coordination and sustained preparedness investment. Its discussion highlighted COVID-19 inequity; e.g., in December 2022, approximately 22% of people in low-income countries were fully vaccinated, compared with 75% in high-income countries.
    • Relationship with the Pandemic Agreement: The Political Declaration mobilises leadership and political commitments; the WHO Pandemic Agreement establishes treaty provisions that become binding for its parties after entry into force. Completing the PABS annex remains central to translating the latter into an operational framework.
What are India’s Stakes in the WHO Pandemic Agreement?
  • Vaccine Manufacturing Leadership and Predictable Global Procurement:
    • WHO’s Global Vaccine Market Report 2024 found that manufacturers in India supplied 55% of vaccines sourced by the WHO African Region and 56% by the Eastern Mediterranean Region in 2023. These figures demonstrate India’s importance to regions with limited domestic manufacturing capacity.
    • Indian producers have an interest in predictable procurement, transparent allocation and financially workable supply contracts.
    • As manufacturing expands elsewhere, Indian firms could also gain opportunities through regional partnerships, joint ventures and technology services, alongside vaccine exports.
  • Biological-Resource Sovereignty and Returns from Pathogen Sharing:
    • At the 79th World Health Assembly in May 2026, India called for standardised, legally binding contracts governing pathogen access and benefit-sharing, alongside robust traceability mechanisms for pathogen materials and sequence information.
    • Traceability can help establish who accessed a resource, how it was used and what benefits followed. India therefore seeks timely product access, technology transfer and capacity-building, rather than leaving benefits dependent on discretionary assistance.
  • Technology Access, Intellectual Property Flexibilities and Biopharma Upgrading:
    • Biopharma SHAKTI, announced in the Union Budget 2026–27, provides ₹10,000 crore over 5 years for a broader ecosystem of biologics and biosimilars. Access to production expertise, platform technologies and international research partnerships could complement this domestic industrial investment.
    • India’s priorities include access to manufacturing know-how, specialised processes, licensing arrangements and trained personnel. Retaining TRIPS public-health flexibilities also matters for affordable production.
  • Essential Input Security and Protection against Supply Disruptions:
    • India imported worth approximately US$4.35 billion across 200 categories of APIs, bulk drugs and drug intermediates in FY 2024–25. China supplied about 73.7% of that import value.
    • International cooperation on supply continuity could support access to essential inputs during emergencies. Diversified sourcing and domestic production remain crucial because a shortage upstream can undermine both Indian treatment capacity and the country’s commitments to overseas buyers.
  • Integrated Surveillance and Earlier Detection of Emerging Threats:
    • India stands to benefit from international scientific cooperation that strengthens detection across human, animal and environmental systems.
    • The May 2026 review of the National One Health Mission reported initiation of genomics and metagenomics-based surveillance networks, alongside surveillance initiatives involving zoos, bird sanctuaries and slaughterhouses.
  • Clinical Research Opportunities and International Regulatory Credibility:
    • The Agreement could strengthen India’s participation in developing, evaluating and supplying new medical countermeasures.
    • The 2026–27 Budget proposed a network of over 1,000 accredited clinical-trial sites and a dedicated scientific-review cadre to strengthen CDSCO. International research cooperation could help these investments generate high-quality evidence and product-development partnerships.
  • Global South Leadership and Sovereign Negotiating Policy Space:
    • The Agreement provides India a platform to shape international health cooperation around equity while preserving domestic decision-making flexibility.
    • At the September 2026 UN PPPR meeting, India reported supplying 300 million Covid-19 vaccine doses to around 100 countries and two UN entities, alongside medical assistance to over 150 countries. This experience supports its claim to a substantive role in designing global emergency-access arrangements.
What are the Key Concerns Associated with the WHO Pandemic Agreement?
  • Dilution of Intellectual Property (IP) Waivers & “Mutually Agreed Terms”:
    • Low- and Middle-Income Countries (LMICs) pushed for automatic, mandatory intellectual property waivers and technology transfers during a declared Pandemic Emergency. However, the final treaty text limits technology transfers to “Mutually Agreed Terms” (MAT).
    • Rather than establishing a new, frictionless legal waiver for pandemic countermeasures, the agreement relies on existing TRIPS flexibilities under the 2001 Doha Declaration. Critics point out that issuing Compulsory Licenses (CLs) individually remains politically and administratively cumbersome for resource-constrained nations during an acute emergency.
  • Stalemate over the Pathogen Access and Benefit-Sharing (PABS) Annex:
    • LMICs routinely share physical virus samples and Genetic Sequence Data (GSD) through open platforms. Under the core treaty text, participating biomedical manufacturers using the PABS repository must reserve 20% of real-time production of pandemic countermeasures for WHO distribution (10% as free donations, 10% at affordable prices).
    • High-income nations and multinational pharmaceutical lobbies contend that forcing a 20% quota—alongside mandatory monetary contributions to the PABS system—undermines private biomedical R&D incentives. Consequently, negotiations over the technical PABS Annex remain stalled.
  • Unfunded Mandates and Eco-Health Burdens under the ‘One Health’ Pillar:
    • Article 5 mandates robust One Health surveillance systems to monitor wildlife markets, intensive livestock operations, and environmental spillover points.
    • High-biodiversity LMICs in Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America carry the largest responsibility for biosecurity and zoonotic surveillance. However, the treaty lacks a guaranteed, direct funding mechanism to subsidize the construction of field laboratories, veterinary networks, or genomics infrastructure in these regions.
  • Ambiguity and Weakness of the Coordinating Financial Mechanism:
    • Early drafts advocated for an independent, mandatory global health emergency fund. Instead, the finalized text relies on a Coordinating Financial Mechanism that aggregates voluntary contributions from existing multilateral platforms.
    • Without mandatory assessable contributions from high-income states, the financial architecture risks falling into the same underfunding traps that plagued the COVAX Facility and ACT-Accelerator during the Covid-19 pandemic.
  • Absence of Binding Enforcement and Sanctions for “Supply Nationalism”:
    • The agreement lacks coercive legal teeth, dispute settlement penalties, or financial sanctions against member states that enforce unilateral export bans or pre-book supplies through bilateral advance market commitments.
    • During an acute global shortage, national emergency decrees in manufacturing nations can legally override international treaty commitments, leaving the WHO-coordinated Global Supply Chain and Logistics Network vulnerable to unilateral seizure.
  • Sovereign Encroachment Concerns vs. Misinformation Realities:
    • Public debate in several Western nations has been fueled by claims that the treaty empowers the WHO to unilaterally impose domestic lockdowns, quarantine rules, or mandatory vaccination drives.
    • Although Article 3 affirms that the WHO possesses no legal authority to overrule domestic legislation or health mandates, sovereign sensitivity concerns have led major political blocs to demand additional oversight over WHO emergency declarations.
  • Geopolitical Fragmentation and Major-Power Disengagement:
    • Formal notifications of intent to withdraw or dissociate from final negotiating rounds by major economies create funding and enforcement uncertainty. E.g., the US has explicitly distanced itself from the international framework, notably also rejecting parallel UN declarations on pandemic preparedness due to concerns over national sovereignty, intellectual property rights, and the mandatory sharing mechanisms.
    • The growth of parallel regional health initiatives (such as regional vaccine manufacturing hubs) risks fragmenting the global response architecture into competing regional blocs rather than a unified WHO system.
  • Resistance from the Global Pharmaceutical Sector:
    • Industry associations (e.g., IFPMA) argue that imposing strict price controls, mandatory benefit-sharing quotas, and pressure for non-voluntary know-how transfers will stifle private venture capital in high-risk biomedical R&D.
    • Commercial entities warn that forced technology transfers without adequate quality controls or raw-material guarantees could lead to sub-standard manufacturing and distort global supply chains during a crisis.
What Measures are Needed to Make an Inclusive and Sustainable WHO Pandemic Agreement?
  • Operational PABS Contracts with Clear Benefits and Delivery Deadlines:
    • Develop standard contract templates specifying product reservations, delivery schedules, pricing methods, technology-support commitments and dispute-resolution procedures.
    • Draw on WHO’s Standard Material Transfer Agreement 2 (SMTA2) under the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework, which obtains legally binding benefit-sharing commitments from recipients of influenza biological materials. Adapt this experience to different pathogen and product categories, with clear responsibilities when suppliers cannot meet agreed timelines.
  • Predictable Financing with Need-Based Grants and Rapid Disbursement:
    • Negotiate multi-year contributions, allocate grants using transparent risk-and-capacity assessments, and provide application support for countries with limited administrative resources. Establish pre-approved emergency financing windows with defined activation criteria and expenditure safeguards.
    • Partner with the World Bank’s Pandemic Fund and regional development banks (e.g., ADB, AfDB) to create pre-approved, automated contingent credit lines that release emergency liquidity immediately upon a Pandemic Emergency declaration.
  • Public Funding Linked to Affordable Access and Technology Sharing:
    • Include equitable-access clauses in public research grants and advance-purchase agreements: affordable-pricing commitments, stockpile obligations, licensing options and access to necessary manufacturing expertise.
    • Negotiate continuity rights, allowing an agreed alternative producer to maintain supply if the original partner cannot fulfil its commitments, consistent with applicable law.
  • Inclusive Governance, Weighted Assembly Voting, and Civil Society Seats:
    • Design the governing structure of the Conference of the Parties (COP) so that decision-making authority is not dominated by donor states or major pharmaceutical producers.
    • Grant formal consultative and observer status to Global South civil society organizations, indigenous groups, healthcare worker unions, and independent public health experts within COP committees.
    • Create an autonomous, non-politicized Fact-Finding and Compliance Panel—similar to human rights treaty bodies—to audit state compliance with surveillance, benefit-sharing, and technology-transfer mandates transparently.
  • Binding Supply-Chain Logistics Protocols and Export Ban Restrictions:
    • Operationalize the Global Supply Chain and Logistics Network as an autonomous multilateral entity with pre-negotiated transit rights and customs clearance protocols.
    • Include binding treaty commitments that automatically suspend national export bans or transit restrictions on essential raw materials (such as single-use bioreactor bags, lipids, vials, and PPE) during an active PHEIC or Pandemic Emergency.
    • Establish geographically distributed regional stockpiles under WHO oversight, bypassing high-income advance market commitments (AMCs) and national hoarding risks.
Conclusion
  • The WHO Pandemic Agreement marks a decisive step toward equitable global health governance, yet its success depends on bridging North-South fault lines. Finalizing the Pathogen Access and Benefit-Sharing (PABS) Annex, securing sustainable financing, and protecting intellectual property flexibilities are critical. For India, active engagement reinforces its leadership as the “Pharmacy of the World,” ensuring global public goods are distributed fairly while safeguarding national sovereignty and domestic healthcare security in future pandemics.