Skip to main content

Comrades Editorial · 15 Oct 2026 (PDF)

​
In this edition

  1. India–US Relations: Resolving Friction, Building Trust International Relations

​
International Relations

​
India–US Relations: Resolving Friction, Building Trust

Source This editorial is based on “India-U.S. ties and the hurdle of American unilateralism” published in The Hindu on 14/10/2026. The article highlights that persistent American pressure—exemplified by unilateral trade measures, visa restrictions like the PERM program suspension, and secondary sanctions—threatens the strategic convergence between both nations, necessitating firm resistance and institutionalized parity. Recent domestic immigration crackdowns and economic friction have brought structural strains to the forefront of India–U.S. strategic ties, challenging the long-term sustainability of their bilateral partnership. Despite growing convergence in defense co-production, critical technologies, clean energy, and Indo-Pacific security, deep-seated friction over trade protectionism, Russian crude imports, and skilled labor restrictions persists. Addressing these execution bottlenecks requires institutionalized mechanisms and mutual respect for strategic autonomy. What Key Sectors Drive Strategic Cooperation between India and the US?
  • Defense Interoperability and Co-Production Platforms:
    • Transitioning from a buyer-seller model to deep industrial co-development under the US-India Defense Industrial Cooperation Roadmap—supported by foundational agreements like LEMOA, COMCASA, and BECA—enables high-tech military manufacturing.
    • The co-production agreement for GE F414 jet engines in India by GE Aerospace and Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) with ~80% technology transfer, alongside the joint manufacturing of Stryker armored vehicles and M777 howitzer components, reinforces indigenous defense ecosystems like Aatmanirbhar Bharat.
    • Operational convergence in the Indo-Pacific is further strengthened through expanded Quad initiatives, anti-submarine exercises during Exercise Malabar, and the INDUS-X (India-U.S. Defense Acceleration Ecosystem) platform, which bridges defense tech startups across both nations.
  • Critical and Emerging Technologies:
    • Strategic technology integration under the Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (iCET)—and its expanded U.S.–India TRUST (Transforming the Relationship Utilizing Strategic Technology) initiative—builds secure supply chains in dual-use tech.
    • Cooperation spans secure 5G/6G Open RAN deployments, quantum computing networks, and high-performance AI ecosystems.
    • India’s inclusion in strategic tech coalitions such as Pax Silica secures global semiconductor supply chains, while domestic investments—like Micron’s $2.75 billion semiconductor assembly and testing facility in Gujarat and major global AI data infrastructure projects—reduce exposure to concentrated foreign tech hubs.
  • Commercial Trade, Digital Services, and Bilateral Investment:
    • Total U.S.-India bilateral trade in goods and services reached $239 billion in 2025, positioning the United States as India’s largest single trading partner.
    • Trade velocity is driven by non-petroleum merchandise, pharmaceutical generics, capital machinery, and digital services exports, supported by structural platforms like the U.S.-India Strategic Trade Dialogue (IUSSTD).
    • Strategic trade flows are further reinforced by the U.S.-India CEO Forum and the Innovation Handshake, which aim to resolve non-tariff barriers, streamline cross-border venture capital, and build resilient digital public infrastructure (DPI) ecosystems.
  • Space Exploration and Commercial Aerospace Integration:
    • Joint space exploration under the U.S.-led Artemis Accords—signed by India to guide civil space exploration—drives advanced bilateral collaboration between ISRO and NASA.
    • The flagship NISAR (NASA-ISRO Synthetic Aperture Radar) satellite mission delivers dual-frequency (L-band and S-band) radar imaging to monitor global land-surface changes, ecosystem dynamics, and climate hazards.
    • Commercial aerospace integration continues to expand as Indian carriers place multi-billion-dollar fleet acquisition orders with Boeing, creating long-term supply-chain subcontracts for Indian aerospace component manufacturers.
  • Clean Energy Transition, Climate Action, and Critical Minerals:
    • Cooperation under the U.S.-India Climate and Clean Energy Agenda 2030 Partnership focuses on decarbonizing heavy industry and scaling renewable energy infrastructure.
    • The bilateral Critical Minerals and Rare Earths Framework establishes cooperative mining, refining, recycling, and financing channels to secure inputs for electric vehicles (EVs) and grid-scale battery storage, bypassing supply bottlenecks.
    • Joint initiatives under the US-India Energy Security Forum accelerate the deployment of green hydrogen, utility-scale solar parks, and off-grid clean energy solutions across South Asia.
  • Civil Nuclear Energy and Advanced Reactor Development:
    • Long-term civil nuclear cooperation rooted in the historic U.S.-India 123 Agreement continues to evolve toward modern reactor deployments.
    • Under updated domestic regulatory frameworks like the SHANTI Act, 2025, both nations are exploring joint deployment models for Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) and Bharat Small Reactors (BSRs) to decarbonize captive industrial units.
    • Ongoing technical integration between NPCIL and U.S. nuclear technology providers aims to resolve legacy engineering and supply-chain barriers for large-scale Pressurized Water Reactors (PWRs).
  • Healthcare, Biosecurity, and Pharmaceutical Supply Chains:
    • Strategic healthcare cooperation leverages India’s position as the “pharmacy of the world” alongside U.S. biomedical innovation to address global health security.
    • The U.S.-India Health Dialogue prioritizes joint R&D in oncology (linking the Tata Memorial Centre with the U.S. National Cancer Institute), vaccine development, and active pharmaceutical ingredient (API) supply-chain diversification.
    • Joint biosecurity frameworks focus on combating Antimicrobial Resistance (AMR), strengthening genomic disease surveillance, and maintaining regulatory harmonization via the U.S. FDA’s India office to ensure pharmaceutical quality standards.
  • Education, Human Capital, and Knowledge Economy Networks:
    • Deep people-to-people ties and talent mobility form the socio-economic backbone of the strategic partnership.
    • Over 330,000 Indian students in the U.S. represent a primary driver of higher education ties, while U.S. tech firms rely on Indian Global Capability Centers (GCCs) for high-value R&D.
    • Institutional mechanisms like the U.S.-India Global Challenges Institute—a joint consortium of top research universities (e.g., IITs paired with the Association of American Universities)—fund collaborative deep-tech research, STEM education exchanges, and joint doctoral programs in semiconductor physics and biotechnology.
What Key Strategic Disagreements Challenge the India–US Bilateral Partnership?
  • Tariff Barriers, Trade Asymmetry and Market-Access Friction:
    • Differences over tariffs, reciprocity and domestic industrial protection continue to complicate economic relations. Bilateral merchandise trade reached US$140 billion in FY2025–26, with a US$33.82 billion surplus in India’s favour, reinforcing American demands for greater market access.
    • USTR’s 2026 National Trade Estimate Report highlights concerns over agricultural and dairy restrictions, medical-device price controls and regulatory requirements. These demands intersect with India’s priorities of farmer protection, affordable healthcare and Make in India.
    • Disagreements over Section 232 duties on steel and aluminium, testing requirements and import licensing add uncertainty to negotiations and business decisions.
  • Strategic Autonomy and Divergent Positions on Russia:
    • India’s commitment to strategic autonomy and multi-alignment creates friction with American efforts to constrain Russia through economic pressure.
    • Russian defence cooperation, including the S-400 system, raises potential CAATSA-related sanctions exposure, while Russian oil purchases have become a separate source of tariff pressure.
      • Washington imposed an additional 25% tariff linked to Russian oil purchases in August 2025; its February 2026 order removed that duty but retained the possibility of recommending its reimposition under the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act, 2026.
    • S Jaishankar’s October 2026 description of the US as having become a “lonelier power”, alongside his criticism of the weaponisation of leverage, illustrates concerns about coercive international bargaining.
  • Intellectual Property Rights and Digital-Regulatory Differences:
    • Disagreements over patent protection, pharmaceutical affordability and cross-border data governance constrain cooperation in knowledge-intensive sectors.
    • India remained on USTR’s 2026 Special 301 Priority Watch List, with Washington continuing to question Section 3(d) of the Patents Act, 1970.
      • This provision restricts patents on new forms of known substances without enhanced efficacy, supporting India’s safeguards against patent evergreening.
    • Digital friction also arises from sector-specific localisation requirements, such as RBI’s payment-data storage rules. Section 16 of India’s Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 governs the processing and transfer of personal data outside India.
  • Agricultural Subsidies and WTO Negotiating Deadlocks:
    • Differences over public stockholding, minimum support prices and agricultural trade disciplines reflect contrasting approaches to food security and market competition.
    • India defends MSP-based procurement for public stocks that support food-distribution programmes, including National Food Security Act (NFSA), 2013 and Pradhan Mantri Garib Kalyan Anna Yojana (PMGKAY), while the US questions their effects on production and international markets. USTR’s 2026 report specifically criticises India’s market-price support for rice and its demand for expanded public-stockholding protection.
    • India seeks a permanent solution on public stockholding, beyond the conditional protection of the existing peace clause, which continues until a permanent solution is adopted.
  • Regional-Security Divergence and Disputed Mediation Claims:
    • Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific and Quad does not eliminate disagreements over Pakistan or third-party involvement in South Asian security.
    • President Trump’s June 2025 meeting with Pakistan’s army chief, occurred alongside his claims that American intervention helped halt hostilities following Operation Sindoor.
      • India explicitly disputed this account, stating that cessation of military action resulted from direct India–Pakistan military communications, without American mediation or trade bargaining.
    • The August 2026 Mecca Joint Defence Agreement between Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Türkiye and Washington’s implicit support for it raise core strategic concerns for New Delhi.
  • Technology-Transfer Constraints and Defence-Delivery Bottlenecks:
    • Export controls, licensing procedures and supply-chain vulnerabilities create an implementation gap between strategic commitments and industrial outcomes.
    • Despite signing a 10-year Framework for the U.S.-India Major Defence Partnership (October 2025) and initiatives like INDUS-X, meaningful technology transfer and co-production remain limited, evidenced by persistent delays in U.S. delivery of GE F404 engines for India’s LCA Tejas.
    • Breakthrough initiatives such as iCET and the TRUST Initiative face structural execution bottlenecks, highlighting the gap between high-level diplomatic declarations and concrete technology sharing.
  • Immigration Restrictions and Skilled-Talent Mobility:
    • Restrictions on H-1B access, employer-sponsored permanent residency and professional mobility create uncertainty for Indian workers and technology firms.
    • In October 2026, US authorities suspended new and pending PERM (Permanent Labour Certification) labour-certification applications involving companies including Infosys, TCS, Wipro, HCLTech and Cognizant, citing alleged misuse of foreign-worker programmes.
      • PERM is an important stage in employer-sponsored green-card processing, so the suspension can disrupt eligible employees’ permanent-residency pathways.
    • The wider sensitivity is evident in USCIS data showing that India-born beneficiaries accounted for 71% of approved H-1B petitions in US FY2024.
What Measures can Resolve Friction in India-US Relations?
  • Institutionalizing a Balanced Comprehensive FTA Framework:
    • Transitioning from piecemeal disputes to a phased Bilateral Trade and Investment Agreement (BTIA) or a multi-tiered FTA framework can bridge market-access friction.
    • Establishing pre-agreed tariff corridors for agricultural exports and high-tech capital goods, alongside mutual recognition agreements (MRAs) for medical devices and generic pharmaceuticals, reduces the frequency of Section 301 investigations and unilateral tariff escalations.
    • Resolving agricultural subsidy disputes by codifying a permanent WTO Peace Clause mechanism protects India’s Public Stockholding (PSH) programs while offering structured import quotas for non-sensitive U.S. agro-commodities.
  • Technology Transfers via iCET and TRUST Real-Time Fast-Tracks:
    • Eliminating execution bottlenecks within iCET and the U.S.–India TRUST Initiative requires establishing an autonomous Defense and Dual-Use Technology Licensing Cell.
    • Streamlining export controls under the U.S. International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) and Export Administration Regulations (EAR) expedites the delivery of critical components, such as GE F404 and F414 jet engines for India’s Tejas program.
    • Creating co-developed patent pools for AI models, quantum computing, and Open RAN telecommunications architecture secures dual-use technology sharing without compromising intellectual property rights.
  • “Sanctions-Safe” Energy and Strategic Autonomy Mechanism:
    • Mitigating friction over India’s import of discounted Russian crude oil and defense systems (e.g., S-400 Triumf) involves institutionalizing a high-level Strategic Energy and Security Dialogue.
    • Establishing a pre-cleared, long-term trade framework for the U.S. Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG), green hydrogen, and Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) under the SHANTI Act, 2025 framework helps diversify India’s energy imports.
    • Providing statutory, formal CAATSA waivers for legacy non-Western defense equipment prevents secondary sanctions risks, respecting New Delhi’s strategic autonomy while progressively deepening defense co-production.
  • Establishing Reciprocal Skilled Mobility Protocols and PERM Reforms:
    • Instituting a dedicated U.S.–India STEM Mobility Compact with fast-tracked H-1B, L-1, and O-1 visa tracks for deep-tech researchers, AI specialists, and advanced engineers maintains talent flows.
    • Expanding domestic “in-country” H-1B visa renewal initiatives reduces processing backlogs, offering long-term policy certainty for Indian knowledge professionals and American technology firms alike.
  • Harmonizing Data Governance and IP Protection Frameworks:
    • Reconciling differences over India’s DPDP Act, 2023 and U.S. cross-border data transfer demands requires establishing a Bilateral Data Privacy and Trust Corridor.
    • Creating secure cloud-interoperability standards and “trusted data zones” accommodates local storage requirements for sensitive financial and health data while facilitating cross-border commercial data flows for multinational firms.
  • Re-anchoring Indo-Pacific Convergence and De-conflictualizing Regional Policy:
    • Establishing an active South Asia Security Consultative Mechanism prevents policy disconnects regarding U.S. diplomatic engagements in South Asia, including relations with Pakistan’s military leadership or developments in Afghanistan.
    • Prioritizing joint maritime domain awareness, critical undersea cable infrastructure, and disaster relief across the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) reinforces operational convergence.
  • Accelerating Supply-Chain Decoupling and Industrial Co-Production:
    • Securing critical supply chains away from single-country vulnerabilities requires expanding co-manufacturing ecosystems under the U.S.-India Defense Industrial Cooperation Roadmap and INDUS-X.
    • Establishing joint semiconductor fabrication units, critical mineral processing facilities, and active pharmaceutical ingredient (API) hubs under a Resilient Supply Chain Fund builds industrial self-reliance.
    • Joint investments in battery storage, rare-earth processing, and solar manufacturing convert bilateral strategic alignment into tangible economic resilience.
Conclusion
  • India–US relations are too strategically significant to be derailed by episodic trade disputes, immigration restrictions or geopolitical differences. However, shared concerns over the Indo-Pacific cannot substitute for tangible progress in technology transfer, market access and skilled mobility. Both countries must strengthen institutional dialogue, pursue balanced economic arrangements and respect India’s strategic autonomy. A pragmatic, trust-based partnership can transform existing friction into opportunities for resilient supply chains, technological innovation and a stable multipolar international order.