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# 27 Oct 2026 · Editorial

> Comrades Editorial of 27 Oct 2026, by news group.

> **[Comrades Editorial · 27 Oct 2026 (PDF)](https://dl.joincomrades.com/e/27-10-26)**

***

## In this edition

1. [Revitalizing India’s SEZs](#h-1) Economic Scenario

## Economic Scenario

### Revitalizing India’s SEZs

<sub>[Source](https://www.drishtiias.com/current-affairs-news-analysis-editorials/news-editorials/27-10-2026)</sub>

**This editorial is based on "Return of SEZ goods:** Welcome relief, unresolved issues" published in the Business Standard on 26/10/2026. The article highlights that while amending SEZ Rule 49(2) eases duty refunds for unaccepted DTA supplies, tight 30-day deadlines, post-delivery rejection ambiguities, and unresolved Section 74 drawback disputes still require urgent clarification.

The Ministry of Commerce and Industry has amended Rule 49(2) of the Special Economic Zones (SEZ) Rules, 2006, allowing Domestic Tariff Area buyers to claim Section 27 Customs duty refunds on returned duty-paid goods. Alongside semiconductor-focused land relaxations, this reform addresses long-standing customs barriers, signaling a strategic shift toward domestic integration, high-tech manufacturing, and broader employment and economic enclaves.

**How Special Economic Zones Evolved in India?**

* Phase I — Export Processing Zone Experimentation (1965–1999)
  * **Beginning with Export Processing Zones under a Controlled Economy:**
    * India established Asia’s first Export Processing Zone (EPZ) at Kandla in 1965, creating an enclave to facilitate exports within a highly regulated economy.
    * Santacruz Electronics Export Processing Zone (SEEPZ), Mumbai, followed in 1973, initially focusing on electronics before expanding into gems and jewellery in 1987–88.
    * However, multiple clearances, inadequate infrastructure and uncertainty over incentives limited the effectiveness of the EPZ model, creating the case for a more comprehensive framework.
* Phase II — Policy Transition and Statutory Institutionalisation (2000–2006)
  * **Transition towards a Comprehensive SEZ Policy:**
    * The SEZ Policy announced in April 2000 sought to overcome EPZ limitations through better infrastructure, simplified regulation and an attractive fiscal framework.
    * Its objectives extended to foreign and domestic investment, employment generation and infrastructure development, alongside exports.
    * From November 2000 to February 2006, SEZs operated under the Foreign Trade Policy and relevant fiscal statutes, establishing the policy direction before the introduction of dedicated legislation.
  * **Institutionalisation through the SEZ Act and Rules:**
    * The SEZ Act, 2005, supported by the SEZ Rules, 2006, became operational in February 2006.
    * The framework introduced single-window approvals, simplified procedures and self-certification, while assigning responsibilities to state governments and the Board of Approval. It supported broader participation by public and private investors.
    * An SEZ receives distinct treatment as outside India’s customs territory for authorised operations, while remaining within Indian sovereignty and the applicable legal framework.
* Phase III — Expansion, Sectoral Diversification and Policy Recalibration (2007–2018)
  * **Diversification into Services and Specialised Export Clusters:**
    * SEZ development expanded beyond merchandise manufacturing into IT/ITeS, pharmaceuticals, biotechnology, engineering and warehousing, with technology-linked activities becoming particularly prominent.
    * In 2008–09, 60 of 98 exporting SEZs were IT/ITeS zones. The enduring services-oriented structure is reflected in the December 2025 sectoral statement, which recorded 167 of 276 operational SEZs in the combined IT/ITeS/electronic hardware and software category.
    * These zone counts indicate sectoral concentration, rather than corresponding shares of exports or employment.
  * **Mid-Course Correction in Incentives, Land Requirements and Policy Design:**
    * The initial framework underwent recalibration when the Finance Act, 2011 made Minimum Alternate Tax applicable from assessment year 2012–13 to SEZ developers and units.
    * In 2013, minimum land requirements were reduced from 1,000 to 500 hectares for multi-product SEZs and 100 to 50 hectares for sector-specific SEZs.
    * The Baba Kalyani Committee’s 2018 review subsequently examined WTO compatibility, vacant-land utilisation and integration with industrial corridors, signalling greater emphasis on competitiveness and productive utilisation.
* Phase IV — Operational Flexibility and Digital-Service Adaptation (2019–2024)
  * **Adaptation to Digital Services and Flexible Work Arrangements:**
    * Regulation increasingly accommodated business models in which employees need not work continuously within a physically enclosed zone.
    * Rule 43A of SEZ Rules, 2006 provided a framework for eligible employees to work from home, subject to prescribed conditions. The December 2024 amendment extended the relevant permission period to 31st December 2027.
    * This marked an operational shift towards digitally delivered exports and hybrid working, while retaining oversight of authorised SEZ activities.
* Phase V — Strategic Manufacturing, Domestic Integration and Specialised Services (2025–2026)
  * **Reorientation towards Semiconductors and Strategic Manufacturing:**
    * June 2025 amendments to the SEZ Rules, 2006 reduced the minimum contiguous land requirement for exclusive semiconductor or electronic-component SEZs from 50 to 10 hectares, alongside changes to land-encumbrance and Net Foreign Exchange accounting provisions.
    * Examples include Micron’s packaging SEZ at Sanand and Aequs’ electronics-component SEZ at Dharwad. In April 2026, the government notified Tata Semiconductor Manufacturing’s 66 hectare SEZ at Dholera, with proposed investment of ₹91,000 crore.
    * These developments demonstrate a shift towards capital-intensive technology ecosystems, although proposed investment remains distinct from realised outcomes.
  * **Stronger Linkages with the Domestic Market and Manufacturing Capacity:**
    * The government notified conditional customs-duty concessions for eligible SEZ-to-Domestic Tariff Area sales for April 2026–March 2027.
    * Eligible clearances are capped at 30% of the highest annual FOB (free on board) export value in the preceding three financial years, with conditions including minimum 20% value addition. This seeks to improve capacity utilisation while retaining export orientation.
    * Separately, the October 2026 amendment to Rule 49 streamlined specified procedures for returning, reselling and repairing duty-paid goods supplied to domestic buyers.
  * **Extension into International Financial Services and Asset Leasing:**
    * Specialised arrangements for International Financial Services Centres have expanded the framework’s relevance to finance and internationally traded services.
    * The October 2026 Amendment aligned the commencement of an IFSC unit’s service activity with its first final IFSCA recognition, registration, licence or authorisation. It also allowed eligible aircraft- and ship-leasing entities to share office space or manpower under prescribed conditions.
    * This reflects adaptation to the requirements of fund management, financial services and cross-border leasing.
  * **Expansion into a Significant Export, Investment and Employment Network:**
    * SEZ exports increased from ₹22,840 crore in 2005–06 to ₹16,36,192 crore in 2025–26, measured in nominal rupees.
    * The official March 2026 factsheet recorded 368 notified SEZs, 277 operational SEZs, approximately ₹7.60 lakh crore in investment and 32.61 lakh persons employed.

What are the Key Concerns Associated with the Functioning of SEZs in India?

* **Persistent Non-Operationalisation and Underutilisation of Approved Capacity:**
  * SEZ approval does not necessarily translate into functioning enterprises, exports or employment.
  * An August 2026 parliamentary reply recorded 95 non-operational SEZs out of 372 notified zones, approximately one-fourth of the total. The government identified statutory approvals, changes in fiscal incentives and adverse business conditions among the reasons for delayed operationalisation.
  * Such delays create opportunity costs, idle infrastructure and uncertainty for investors, weakening the effectiveness of an approach that measures progress primarily through approvals and notifications.
* **Regional Concentration and Reinforcement of Existing Industrial Inequalities:**
  * SEZ development remains concentrated in states with established infrastructure, skilled labour and industrial ecosystems, limiting its contribution to balanced regional development.
  * In July 2026, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Telangana and Maharashtra together accounted for 161 operational SEZs, approximately 58% of the national total. Bihar, Manipur and Nagaland had no operational SEZs.
  * This concentration risks reinforcing existing advantages, while less-industrialised regions struggle to attract investment despite receiving notifications or approvals.
* **Land-Use Inefficiency and Social Opportunity Costs:**
  * Large land commitments can become economically and socially contentious when productive activity fails to materialise.
  * The CAG’s 2014 performance audit recorded that operations had commenced on only 28,488 hectares out of 45,635 hectares of notified SEZ land, approximately 62.42%. This historical finding illustrates the importance of assessing actual utilisation alongside land allocation.
  * Where land conversion affects agriculture or community livelihoods, delayed development can weaken local acceptance and leave promised employment unrealised.
* **Sectoral Imbalance and Low Diversification into Labour-Intensive Manufacturing:**
  * The SEZ portfolio has not developed equally across industries capable of absorbing workers with different educational and skill levels.
  * The December 2025 sectoral statement listed only 6 operational textile/apparel/wool SEZs and 4 footwear/leather SEZs.
  * A narrow sectoral base can constrain employment diversification, local supplier development and opportunities for less-skilled workers, making aggregate export growth an incomplete measure of broad-based industrialisation.
* **Customs Barriers and Uneven Integration with Domestic Supply Chains:**
  * The boundary between an SEZ and the Domestic Tariff Area (DTA) can complicate domestic sales, returns and business linkages through customs procedures and duty treatment.
  * Recent concessions address part of this difficulty, but their coverage remains selective. For example, the 2026 concessional domestic-sales framework excludes sectors such as gems and jewellery, petroleum, and specified agricultural products, as well as Free Trade Warehousing Zone units.
  * Consequently, relief is uneven across activities, while manufacturers must navigate different eligibility conditions, creating concerns about capacity utilisation and competitive neutrality.
* **Short Policy Horizons and Uncertainty over Export-Cost Remission:**
  * Long-gestation investments require predictable treatment of embedded taxes and export costs. However, time-bound extensions can leave firms uncertain when pricing contracts or planning capacity.
  * In October 2026, the government extended RoDTEP coverage, including eligible SEZ exports, until 31st December 2026, retaining existing rates and caps. The concern is the limited visibility beyond the notified period.
  * The 2026 Parliamentary Standing Committee on Commerce also recommended structured consultation and a minimum transition period before rate revisions, recognising the risk of losses on orders contracted under earlier assumptions.
* **Trade-Law Constraints on Export-Contingent Incentive Design:**
  * SEZ support must reconcile investment promotion with obligations under the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.
  * In DS541 (Export Related Measures), a 2019 WTO panel found certain challenged SEZ exemptions and deductions to constitute prohibited export subsidies. Importantly, India and the United States settled the dispute in July 2023; India withdrew its appeal, and the parties agreed that the panel report would not be adopted.
  * The episode nevertheless demonstrates the vulnerability of export-contingent incentive structures and the importance of legally robust policy design.
* **Fragmented Governance and Incomplete Realisation of Single-Window Clearance:**
  * SEZ enterprises interact with Development Commissioners, customs authorities, state agencies and other statutory bodies, creating scope for overlapping requirements, inconsistent interpretation and approval delays.
  * The March 2026 Parliamentary Standing Committee report called for identifying administrative, regulatory and infrastructure constraints affecting non-operational zones and recommended plug-and-play facilities, shared utilities and stronger logistics connections.

What Reforms can Revitalize India’s Special Economic Zones Effectively?

* **Employment and Economic Enclaves through Outcome-Based Reform:**
  * India should operationalise the Baba Kalyani Committee’s “Employment and Economic Enclaves” approach, evaluating SEZs through additional investment, productive employment, domestic value addition and technology diffusion, alongside exports.
  * The committee recommended separate frameworks for manufacturing and services and a demand-driven approach to zone development. Building on this, publish an annual SEZ Performance Scorecard measuring actual production, worker earnings, land utilisation and local supplier development.
  * Future infrastructure grants should depend on independently verified improvements, with clawback provisions for misrepresentation.
* **Advancing the DESH Reform Agenda for Integrated Economic Hubs:**
  * India should revisit and build consensus on the proposed Development of Enterprises and Services Hubs (DESH) Bill, 2022, or incorporate its workable provisions into the existing SEZ framework.
  * Its proposed features, including stronger single-window clearance, domestic-market integration, a revamped fiscal framework and alternative dispute resolution, provide a basis for comprehensive reform.
  * These changes could strengthen employment generation, investment and domestic value chains.
* **Predictable Fiscal Architecture and Legally Robust Investment Support:**
  * Introduce a rolling five-year policy framework covering tax remission, infrastructure assistance and transition arrangements, enabling investors to price long-term contracts confidently.
  * Support should prioritise shared infrastructure, workforce training, testing facilities and innovation, with each instrument screened for WTO compatibility and excessive subsidy accumulation.
  * India should institutionalise these safeguards through published review calendars and advance notification of material changes, reducing uncertainty for projects with long gestation periods.
* **Deeper Domestic Integration through Supplier Development and Calibrated Market Access:**
  * Establish SEZ–MSME supplier development programmes combining vendor discovery, quality certification, technical mentoring and invoice financing.
  * Anchor firms should publish procurement opportunities and help nearby enterprises meet international standards, strengthening backward linkages and technology spillovers.
  * Any continuation should retain value-addition requirements, digital inventory traceability and safeguards against double benefits, allowing productive domestic integration while preserving the zones’ export orientation.
* **Integrated Digital Governance and Enforceable Clearance Timelines:**
  * Connect SEZ administration, ICEGATE, GST systems, DGFT and state clearance portals through interoperable workflows, introducing “submit once, reuse across agencies” documentation.
  * Each application should display the responsible authority, statutory deadline and reason for delay; unresolved cases should escalate automatically to a joint Centre–state facilitation committee.
  * Apply risk-based inspections and coordinated audits while retaining substantive environmental and safety scrutiny.
* **Brownfield Revival and Demand-Led Regional Diversification:**
  * Create a geospatial inventory of vacant land, unused buildings and infrastructure readiness, followed by time-bound revival plans for commercially viable zones.
  * Offer smaller leased premises, transparent developer substitution and restructuring options where existing arrangements obstruct investment.
  * For less-industrialised regions, release infrastructure funding against anchor-investor commitments and demonstrated market demand, selecting sectors suited to local capabilities. This would combine asset reuse with more credible regional industrialisation.
* **Multimodal Connectivity and Measurable Logistics Reliability:**
  * Prepare a gate-to-port logistics plan for each manufacturing SEZ using PM GatiShakti, identifying missing rail links, road bottlenecks, cold-chain gaps and unreliable utilities.
  * Integrate shipment tracking with the Unified Logistics Interface Platform (ULIP) and introduce service standards for customs clearance, container turnaround and power restoration.
  * Publish actual transit-time variability and logistics costs, helping governments prioritise investments that improve delivery reliability and participation in global value chains.
* **Sector-Specific Innovation Ecosystems and Accessible Shared Facilities:**
  * Develop tailored operating frameworks for semiconductors, medical devices, precision engineering, food processing and knowledge-intensive services, reflecting their different capital, certification and production cycles.
  * Establish shared prototyping centres, accredited laboratories, clean rooms and university–industry research facilities, with affordable access for MSMEs.
* **Green Industrial Infrastructure and Worker-Centred Urban Integration:**
  * Upgrade SEZs using the UNIDO–World Bank–GIZ Eco-Industrial Park framework, combining renewable electricity, water reuse, resource efficiency and industrial symbiosis, where one enterprise’s recoverable waste becomes another’s input.
  * Introduce independently verified energy, water and emissions-intensity benchmarks, supported by common treatment facilities and green finance.
  * Linking industrial infrastructure with workers’ living conditions would improve labour retention and resilience while meeting international buyers’ growing environmental and social compliance requirements.

**Conclusion**

* Unlocking the full potential of India’s Special Economic Zones requires transitioning from rigid, export-contingent enclaves to integrated Employment and Economic Enclaves. Addressing structural bottlenecks, such as non-operationalized capacity, regional industrial concentration, and administrative friction, depends on implementing the Baba Kalyani Committee recommendations. By deepening linkages with domestic supply chains, ensuring predictable fiscal policies, streamlining digital clearances through ICEGATE, and aligning with global trade rules, India can position its SEZs as sustainable drivers of high-tech manufacturing and employment growth.


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